SECTION IV

PART II

The O/NE-O/CI Relationship

It has become apparent over the past year that the function of O/CI in relation to intelligence estimating requires further definition, both as to the degree of estimating to be allowed in current publications, and to O/CI's role in support of the national estimates process. It was originally considered that while O/CI should evaluate and comment on the raw intelligence it was currently reporting, it should refrain from drawing any estimative conclusions. It was thought undesirable that CIA should pass on to high officials of the government estimates hastily produced by a single CIA office which did not represent and might actually conflict with the considered and coordinated judgments of NIE's. practice, however, this distinction between evaluation of intelligence and the drawing of estimates has proved difficult to maintain. O/CI comments in the CIA Daily and weekly publications have frequently ignored the distinction. One solution might be to enforce a flat prohibition against any estimative comment whatsoever. On the other hand, it may well be desirable for current publications to include initial first-hand reactions to the situations reported. In such cases it would obviously be impracticable because of time This document has been

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limitations for O/NE itself to prepare the estimative comments or even to clear those prepared by O/CI. Under these circumstances it would seem necessary, Note(st) to emphasize more clearly that such comments are merely initial off-the-cuff O/CI opinions which might be superseded later by a more considered and fully coordinated NIE. However, In many cases O/CI, instead of making their own estimative comments, could more usefully refer to existing national estimates which represent the coordinated US intelligence view. Up to now CIA current publications have virtually ignored any reference to the numerous national intelligence estimates already produced.

Another problem that has arisen is that of more fully utilazing O/CI resources in support of the national estimates process. O/NE as a small independent office solely concerned with preparing and coordinating national estimates must rely on other CIA offices as well as on the IAC agencies for most of its intelligence support. O/NE has already established effective working relationships with O/RR and O/SI in support of national estimates. However, O/NE stands in a somewhat different position relative to O/CI than it does to these other offices, which provide services of "common concern" not available elsewhere. O/NE has functioned from the

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for national estimates was to be provided by the IAC agencies.

This principle is implicit in the whole national estimates process.

Moreover, except in certain limited fields, O/CI is presumably not in a position to do the full scale research and analysis required.

On the other hand, O/NE, with its limited resources, has from the outset depended upon O/CI's much greater facilities for systematically reviewing and analyzing the vast flow of current intelligence data upon which the estimators must rely. O/CI necessarily is constantly evaluating and processing a large amount of current material which is of great value in keeping the estimators abreast of developments, in providing essential background, and in making certain that the intelligence which goes into national estimates is accurate and up to date. It is in these fields that a closer relationship between the two offices should be developed. O/CI is already performing an extremely useful function in keeping O/NE, along with its other customers, briefed through its daily, weekly, and other current publications which are distributed to all members of O/NE. O/CI analysts have been consulted on various problems and O/CI has met a number of specific O/NE requests. senior O/NE staff member sits with the O/CI Indications Staff and the IAC Watch Committee to keep in close touch with this vital field.

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Nevertheless it seems desirable to utilize O/CI's capabilities more directly in estimates production. Perhaps the chief

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contribution O/CI could make, aside from its current reporting,
would be systematically to assist O/NE in ensuring that the intelligence going into each national estimate represents the
latest information available to the US government, and is accurate
and complete. At the same time O/CI could supplement agency contributions with any further information available to it, particularly from sources not fully processed by the other IAC agencies.
In this manner O/NE could be assured that the information in
national intelligence estimates was verified and supplemented so
far as possible by all US intelligence resources. In this manner
too any inadequacy of the IAC agency contributions could be more
readily detected and remedial measures undertaken. However, in
order that O/CI be made clearly responsible for these highly imper-

ment, the present statement of O/OI mission should be smended to make it an explicit O/OI responsibility to provide national in-

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